Mestrado em Filosofia

URI Permanente para esta coleção

http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/17517

Nível: Mestrado Acadêmico
Ano de início: 2008
Conceito atual na CAPES: 4
Ato normativo: Homologado pelo CNE (Portaria MEC Nº 609, de 14/03/2019). Publicação no DOU 18 de março de 2019, seç. 1 - Parecer CNE/CES nº 487/2018, Processo no 23001.000335/2018-51). Publicado no DOU 28/07/2005, seção 1, página 11)
Periodicidade de seleção: Semestral
Área(s) de concentração: Filosofia
Url do curso: https://filosofia.ufes.br/pt-br/pos-graduacao/PPGFil/detalhes-do-curso?id=47

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Agora exibindo 1 - 5 de 125

O liberalismo político de John Bordley Rawls: uma análise da concepção política de pessoa
(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2026-02-27) Marques, Wellington Alan Soares; Araújo, Ricardo Corrêa de; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0431-8599; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5638777509855807; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6537-7680; http://lattes.cnpq.br/9457599500128323; Mauricio Junior, Alceu; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0521-7394; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4849524100434033; Barbosa, Evandro; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5695-3746; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4540090727696342
This dissertation investigates how the political conception of the person in John Rawls provides the foundation that justifies the primacy of political values over religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive values within a well-ordered society. To this end, it examines the evolution of the conception of the person from A theory of justice (1971), where it is presented as a moral conception based on the two moral powers, to Political liberalism (1993), where it becomes a strictly political conception, referring to the citizen of well-ordered society, and independent of any specific comprehensive doctrine. From this analysis arises a necessary terminological distinction between public identity (of the citizen), comprehensive moral identity (of non-public commitments), and total moral identity (their synthesis through an overlapping consensus). The research demonstrates that by understanding themselves as free in the three senses proposed by Rawls, independence in relation to a particular conception of the good, self-authentication of their claims, and responsibility for their ends, citizens internalize and prioritize the political virtues and values. It concludes that by delimiting the political domain as a sphere of public justification, Rawls provides a coherent response to the problem of social stability under conditions of reasonable pluralism, sustaining the possibility of a reflective (and non-coercive) adherence to the primacy of political values and virtues.
Mulheres, capitalismo e a violência patriarcal para Saffioti
(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2025-12-08) Sana, Domitila Morais; Dias, Maria Cristina Cardoso Longo; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1007-2449; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8581414763000546; https://orcid.org/0009-0003-6294-1260; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5384211411714699; Aggio, Juliana Ortegosa; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6283-4797; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5290499042057589; Bonnet, Annabelle; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4312-2310; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4916125651933085
This work investigates how violence against women in Brazil structurally expresses and reproduces the articulation between patriarchy, racism, and capitalism, configured as the “symbiotic knot,” described by Heleieth Saffioti. It investigates two questions: What is the relationship between patriarchy oppression and violence against women? Which philosophical concepts can be mobilized to analyze violence against women as an expression of these forms of oppression? Methodologically, it combines a literature review with the analysis of secondary data for the period 2019–2025, drawn from the Brazilian Public Security Yearbook of the Brazilian Forum on Public Security (FBSP), the Atlas of Violence (Institute for Applied Economic Research and FBSP), and the National Survey on Violence against Women (DataSenado). Chapter 1 maps the symbiotic knot—capitalism, patriarchy, and racism—as well as its formulation, in dialogue with intersectionality. Chapter 2 discusses gender, power, and violence, culminating in empirical analyses. The findings indicate the concentration of femicides in the home and in intimate relationships, the overrepresentation of Black women, and the aggravation produced by material and territorial vulnerabilities. This work concludes that gender-based violence remains functional to the reproduction of the social order as long as the mechanisms of the symbiotic knot persist; that women’s emancipation is inseparable from a simultaneous critique of class exploitation and racism; and that the symbiotic knot remains current and applicable both for interpreting Brazilian reality and for guiding transformative action.
O inter-humano como fundamento da communitas communitatum na filosofia dialógica de Martin Buber
(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-12-18) Santos, Milena Scabello; Barreira, Marcelo Martins; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9367-3073; http://lattes.cnpq.br/0690909917220112; https://orcid.org/0009-0000-8703-2213; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1774633763667255; Santiago, Maria Betânia do Nascimento; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8822-1806; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2640094533229805; Dias, Maria Cristina Longo Cardoso; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1007-2449; http://lattes.cnpq.br/8581414763000546
This dissertation explores the notion of the inter-human as a fundamental ethical and ontological principle in Martin Buber’s dialogical philosophy, linking this category to the proposal of a communitas communitatum. Following a hermeneutical approach and a conceptual analysis of the works I and Thou, On Community, Utopian Socialism, and Between Man and Man, the research examines the influence of Hasidism on the development of Buber’s thought, demonstrating how this mystical movement provided the spiritual and ethical foundations for his conception of the I-Thou relation and for his critique of technocratic and instrumentalized modern society. The results show that the inter-human constitutes a solid ontological and ethical basis for overcoming centralized forms of social organization, integrating spirituality, dialogue, and social critique within an existential framework of transformation. The distinction between I-Thou and I-It relations proved decisive for understanding the ethical obstacles of modernity, revealing that the predominance of objectified relations leads to fragmentation and isolation, whereas the I-Thou relation grounds an ethics of responsibility and recognition. The symbolic image of the communitas communitatum synthesizes these elements by proposing a decentralized social model based on dialogue, listening, and inter-human responsibility, whose contemporary relevance was illustrated through the study of Brazilian ecovillages. Thus, it is concluded that Martin Buber’s dialogical philosophy offers an existential and ethical alternative for the rehumanization of relationships and for the communal reconstruction in the face of modern challenges
A profecia se fez como previsto : racionais MC's, uma pedagogia do oprimido
(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2025-11-12) Maranhão, Panna Nawar Everton; Bazzan, Marco Rampazzo; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1194-8289; http://lattes.cnpq.br/1141684502513379; https://orcid.org/; http://lattes.cnpq.br/6400182443623959; Leal, Halina Macedo; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6724-4622; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5698575555739025; Costa, Virgínia Helena Ferreira da; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9287-4634; http://lattes.cnpq.br/4492426643706270
In our work, we observe the impact caused by the group Racionais MC’s in the 1990s as an element of popular pedagogy that is useful for philosophical dialogue. We establish the key to this reading through the tuning present in the work of Paulo Freire and the problem of sentimental connection present in Gramsci. The divisions between intellectual figures and the masses, as well as between teachers and students, are central to us in charting a path that subverts the notion of banking education, moving toward the epistemic valorization of popular word, thus validating Freire’s premise that oppressed people are capable of thinking correctly.
A tese cognitivista da emoção como juízo de valor
(Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2024-11-21) Feitoza, Estela Altoé; Viesenteiner, Jorge Luiz; https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3727-7890; http://lattes.cnpq.br/7444634503835464; https://orcid.org/0009-0002-7054-8517; ; Silveira, Denis Coitinho; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2592-5590; http://lattes.cnpq.br/2755385851635999; Williges, Flávio; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2820-9805; http://lattes.cnpq.br/5467666371380781
This research analyzes Martha Nussbaum's thesis that identifies emotion with value judgment, and also evaluate the limitations and possibilities of her theoretical model, when situated within the broader context of contemporary debate, given that it endorses a cognitive nature for emotion in its evaluative domain. The analysis of Upheavals of Thought showed that Nussbaum defends the intelligibility of emotions based on a common structure, defined exclusively by their cognitive elements: belief (or perception), evaluation, and intentionality. These together, according to a reinterpretation of the ancient Stoics, function as a type of value judgment that may or may not have propositional content. Thus, emotion is defined through its evaluative function of valuing people, situations, and objects on which the subject depends, as highly significant for his existence. It is through their intentional objects contents, that emotions are made intelligible and accessible to the emotional subject, who is supposed to be able to identify and correct them, in case they are inappropriate to circumstances. However, to allow emotions to infants and nonhuman animals, Nussbaum deflates the notion of judgment and argues that they both evaluate cognitively the world through perception of the salience of the environment. To this end, it loosens notions of cognition and intentionality to different levels of sophistication. She understands that emotions have a temporal development that should not be ignored in their episodic occurrences, which are always combined with patterns of agent development, habituation, evolutionary pressures, and the context of events. Infants' incipient cognitive assessments emerge from early attachment relationships with their caregivers and support the development of later emotions. However, they have undifferentiated content, which is incompatible with her preliminary notion of judgment, generating conceptual tension, which makes the identity between emotion and value judgment improbable in infants. By denying that non-cognitive elements are necessary to define emotion, Nussbaum fails to prioritize the felt, bodily and desirable character of emotion and ends up situating herself in the clash between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, which proves counterproductive for the practical understanding of emotions. Even though it is not possible to define emotion as exclusively cognitive in Nussbaum's terms, the possibility that perception, cognition, emotion and values do not have clear boundaries in emotional episodes suggests pointing to a much more complex and reciprocal relationship than the simple opposition between cognitivism and non cognitivism is capable of capturing, which would be more beneficial to be analyzed in light of other paradigms on cognition.

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